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NOTES

Putting the Cart Before the Horse
BARRIERS TO ENFORCING A CODE OF ETHICS FOR
THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In today’s thoroughbred racing world, sometimes what
you see is not at all what you get. Even veteran horsemen will
admit that “[t]here is a fine line between the showmanship of
showing a horse at its fullest and fraud.”1 Most surprisingly,
this deception often begins long before a thoroughbred has even
run its first race. Sales practices that may appear fraudulent
to horse racing outsiders are tolerated, or even accepted as
customary practice, at thoroughbred auctions.2 For example,
before being sold, horses are sometimes injected with steroids
to make their chests appear stronger.3 Agents, hired to bid for
prospective owners, have been caught defrauding their
principals by colluding with sellers and accepting undisclosed
commissions.4 Sellers even use agents to bid on their own
1
Joe Drape, No Gift Horses Here, So Look in Their Mouths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 2005, §1, at 1 [hereinafter Drape, No Gift Horses Here] (quoting John Ward, trainer
of 2001 Kentucky Derby winner, Monarchos).
2
For example, sellers are generally not permitted to bid on their own goods
at public auction. See U.C.C. § 2-328(4) (1977). However, the Conditions of Sale at the
major public thoroughbred auctions all expressly permit owners to bid on their own
horses to run up the purchase price, a practice known as “bi-bidding.” See, e.g.,
BARRETTS, JANUARY MIXED SALE 2007, CONDITIONS OF SALE, available at
http://barretts.com/CATALOG/catjan07/conditon.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007);
KEENELAND THOROUGHBRED RACING & SALES, CONDITIONS OF SALE, available at
http://ww2.keeneland.com/sales/lists/copy/conditions.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
For a discussion of the Conditions of Sale at public auctions and their legal
implications, see infra Part II.B.
3
See Drape, No Gift Horses Here, supra note 1; see also infra note 123
(providing more information on the presale use of anabolic steroids).
4
See, e.g., Gussin v. Shockey, 725 F. Supp. 271, 273 (D. Md. 1989); Ryan
Conley, Leslie Deckard & Dan Liebman, McIngvale Suit Charges Kickbacks to Trainer
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horses at public auctions, resulting in artificially inflated
As in other competitive markets, “the
purchase prices.5
boundary between acceptable sporting behavior and
unacceptable misrepresentation” at thoroughbred auctions “is
Even the term “horse trading” has become
blurred.”6
synonymous with deception.7 To restore public confidence, the
industry itself needs to establish clear standards of what
constitutes acceptable thoroughbred auction practices.
The Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association
(“TOBA”) attempted to do just that in December of 2004, when
it released the Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions (“Code
of Ethics”).8 Founded over forty years ago, TOBA is a nonprofit trade organization “dedicated solely to promoting the
interests of Thoroughbred owners and breeders.”9 TOBA’s
Code of Ethics was inspired by a similar code adopted by the
British Jockey Club10 in the summer of 2004.11 The American
and Agents, BLOODHORSE.COM, Sept. 8, 2006, http://news.bloodhorse.com/viewstory_
plain.asp?id=35240; Joe Drape, A Horseman’s Lawsuit Puts Trading Practices in the
Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at D1 [hereinafter Drape, A Horseman’s Lawsuit]
(detailing recent lawsuit filed by Jess Jackson, owner of Kendall-Jackson Vineyard
Estates, alleging that his agents defrauded him in connection with thoroughbred
purchases).
5
See Robert S. Miller, America Singing: The Role of Custom and Usage in
the Thoroughbred Horse Business, 74 KY. L.J. 781, 788 (1986) (explaining the use of
“bi-bidding” at public thoroughbred auctions); see also Glenye Cain, Sanan Devotes
Himself to Task Force, DAILY RACING FORM, Sept. 17, 2004 [hereinafter Cain, Sanan
Devotes Himself].
6
Susan Rogers Finneran, Knowing Silence of Nonentreprenurial
Information Is Not Sporting, 59 ALB. L. REV. 511, 514 (1996).
7
See Drew L. Kershen, Horse-Tradin’: Legal Implications of Livestock
Auction Bidding Practices, 37 ARK. L. REV. 119, 120 (1983). When the FBI began
investigating a particular fraudulent horse transaction, and “someone mentioned the
case involved cheating and fraud, the FBI’s response was something to the effect of
‘isn’t that what horse traders do?’” KC Reynolds, Commission Conundrum Part 3:
Ethics and Pressure in the Industry . . . Is “Buyer Beware” Becoming a Thing of the
Past?, EQUINE CHRON., available at http://www.equinechronicle.com/Features/
Reynolds/reynoldsCONUNDRUM_pt3.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (quoting equine
appraiser Dave Johnson, who assisted in the case).
8
Press Release, Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Sales Integrity
Task Force Issues Code of Ethics for Horse Auctions (Dec. 17, 2004), available at
http://keeneland.com/news/pressdetail.asp?PID=1678.
9
Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, TOBA Membership,
http://www.toba.org/membership (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
10
THE JOCKEY CLUB, THE BLOODSTOCK INDUSTRY CODE OF PRACTICE,
available at http://www.britishhorseracing.com/images/owning_breeding/The_Bloodstock_
Industry_Code_of_Practice.pdf [hereinafter THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE]
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
11
Press Release, The Jockey Club, Landmark Code of Practice Published by
Bloodstock Industry (July 6, 2004), available at http://thehra.org/doc.php?id=28610
[hereinafter Press Release, The Jockey Club, Landmark Code]. For more information
on the Jockey Club’s Code of Practice, see infra Part III. In April of 2006, the Jockey
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Code, like its British predecessor, aims to minimize deceptive
auction practices by increasing transparency at thoroughbred
sales.
The Code of Ethics articulates required disclosures for
thoroughbred sales at public auctions.12 It is particularly
concerned with issues related to bloodstock agents,13 since they
are so commonly utilized at public auctions, especially by
novice buyers, who are most in need of veterans’ expertise.
Under the Code, bloodstock agents must disclose if they are
representing both the purchaser and the seller in a transaction,
because “dual agency (without disclosure to all parties) is
inherently fraudulent.”14 The Code of Ethics also encourages
full disclosure of owners’ identities, while at the same time
recognizing owners’ privacy interests.15 A potential purchaser
may inquire into the identity of a horse’s owner, but if the
owner’s agent denies this request for information, the potential
purchaser’s only recourse is to delete this horse from
consideration.16
This Note will examine fraudulent thoroughbred
auction practices, focusing specifically on the barriers to
enforcing TOBA’s Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions.
Part II of this Note will provide an introduction to
thoroughbred auctions and a short summary of the legal issues
they implicate, addressing the limited forms of relief available
to dissatisfied purchasers. Part III will briefly describe the
British Jockey Club’s Bloodstock Industry Code of Practice,17
which served as the model for the American thoroughbred
Club turned over its horse racing regulatory responsibilities to the Horseracing
Regulatory Authority (“HRA”). Press releases issued by the Jockey Club are now
hosted on the HRA’s Web site. See infra note 68; text accompanying notes 94-99
(providing further explanation of this transition).
12
See THOROUGHBRED OWNERS AND BREEDERS ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR
THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS arts. I & II, http://www.salesintegrity.org/downloads/
Code_of_Ethics2.pdf [hereinafter TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS] (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
13
Bloodstock agents act as intermediaries in the purchase or sale of a horse.
Robert S. Miller, The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests: A Transactional Approach, 78
KY. L.J. 517, 556 (1989). They are paid a commission, typically five percent of the sale
price, as compensation for their success in locating a buyer or seller and negotiating
the deal. BLOOD-HORSE PUBL’NS, THE BLOOD-HORSE AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO
AUCTIONS 69 (2004) [hereinafter AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS]. Bloodstock
agents are common in thoroughbred sales, where sellers and potential buyers often
lack the necessary time or experience to effectuate the most successful equine
transactions. See infra Part V.A.
14
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12, art. II.
15
Id. art. I.
16
Id.
17
THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10.
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industry’s Code of Ethics.18 Part IV of this Note will explain the
various provisions of the American Code of Ethics for
Thoroughbred Auctions and the industry concerns it reflects.
Part V will compare enforcement powers under the British and
American codes, focusing on how the different regulatory
structures of these countries’ horse racing industries affect the
enforcement of their respective codes. This Part will argue that
the United States’ decentralized regulatory system presents
greater enforcement problems than those faced in the United
Kingdom. Although the Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred
Auctions is a step in the right direction for the American
thoroughbred industry, Part VI will argue that the Code of
Ethics’ drafters failed to give it any real “teeth,”19 rendering its
provisions little more than discretionary guidelines. The Code
is not completely meaningless, however, as Part VI will
contend, for it brings important issues to the forefront of
discussion in the industry. This Note will conclude, however,
that the American thoroughbred industry has gotten way
ahead of itself and should consider implementing a centralized
regulatory body to enforce the Code of Ethics if it truly wants to
improve auction practices.
II.

THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS

A.

Introduction

One of the first major decisions a thoroughbred owner
must face is where to purchase his first racehorse. Although
many racehorses are traded in private transactions or
purchased at claiming races,20 a large percentage of
18

TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Glenye Cain, Ethics Code Encourages Disclosure, Lacks Teeth,
DAILY RACING FORM, Dec. 16, 2004 [hereinafter Cain, Ethics Code] (“The code does not
set forth penalties for infractions or offer specific recourse for aggrieved parties . . . .”);
Cot Campbell, Integrity No Easy Task, BLOODHORSE.COM, Jan. 12, 2005,
http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=26173 (reporting that critics
have questioned “Where are the teeth? No penalties, no disciplinary provisions for
violating the Code.”); Ray Paulick, Cot To Be Good, BLOODHORSE.COM, Dec. 21, 2004,
http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=25891 (“I wish the Sales Integrity
Task Force had come up with a way to enforce the new code of ethics and penalize
known violators.”) [hereinafter Paulick, Cot To Be Good].
20
Each horse that runs in a claiming race is available for sale. Owners enter
their thoroughbreds into races, designated by the price value of the horse. Horses
entered in these races must be sold to any owner who “claims” the horse for its
designated value before the race is run. Each state has its own rules about what
conditions potential owners must meet before they are permitted to submit a claim.
See The Racing Game, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.theracinggame.com/
19
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thoroughbreds are bought and sold at public auctions each
year.21 In 2006 alone, thoroughbred buyers spent over one
billion dollars at public auctions in North America.22
Purchasing a horse at auction may be a particularly attractive
option for newcomers, since this forum offers the widest
selection of horses for sale and “often assure[s] fair market
value.”23
Thoroughbred auctions take place all around the United
States, but the most well-known sales companies are based in
Kentucky (Keeneland and Fasig-Tipton), Florida (Ocala
Breeders’ Sales Company), and California (Barretts).24 These
auctions are typically organized by the horses’ ages and
For example, Keeneland holds separate
intended use.25
auctions each year for two-year-olds-in-training, yearlings,26
breeding stock,27 and a mixed sale with horses of various ages
and purposes.28 Purchasing a yearling is often the least
expensive option for a novice owner looking to break into the
However, because these young
horse racing business.29
lists/faq/allitemsalt.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). Many new owners choose to
“claim” their first thoroughbreds because these horses are ready to race almost
immediately. Additionally, claiming races provide one of the least expensive ways to
purchase a racehorse.
THOROUGHBRED OWNERS AND BREEDERS ASS’N, NEW
THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO THOROUGHBRED
OWNERSHIP 56 (Laura Proctor ed., 2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter NEW THOROUGHBRED
OWNERS HANDBOOK].
21
In 2006, there were approximately 21,247 thoroughbreds sold at public
auctions in North America. This figure includes sales of stallion seasons and stallion
shares. THE JOCKEY CLUB (U.S.), Auction Sales in North America, in 2007 ONLINE
FACT BOOK, http://www.jockeyclub.com/factbook.asp?section=13 (last visited Apr. 20,
2007). A stallion season is the right to mate a mare with a specific stallion for one
breeding season, while a stallion share is a proprietary interest in a specific stallion
that gives the owner the right to breed a mare with that stallion every breeding season.
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 103.
22
THE JOCKEY CLUB (U.S.), supra note 21.
The exact figure of
$1,266,684,292 includes sales of stallion seasons and stallion shares. Id. For an
explanation of stallion seasons and stallion shares, see supra note 21.
23
NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 61.
24
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 19.
25
NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 61.
26
A thoroughbred’s official “birthday” is January 1 of the year it was born.
Once a horse enters its second calendar year, it is considered a “yearling,” regardless of
when the horse was actually born. See id. at 70. Therefore, a two-year-old
thoroughbred is one that has entered its third calendar year.
27
As the name implies, horses sold at “breeding stock” auctions are primarily
intended for breeding purposes, rather than racing. See AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO
AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 15.
28
Keeneland
Thoroughbred
Racing
&
Sales,
Sales
Calendar,
http://ww2.keeneland.com/sales/Events/calendar.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007)
(listing Keeneland’s upcoming thoroughbred auctions).
29
See NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 68.
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thoroughbreds are entirely unproven, with no racing
experience or training, investing in a yearling is also the
biggest gamble for a new owner.30 For some owners, this
gamble pays off. Funny Cide, winner of the 2003 Kentucky
Derby and Preakness Stakes, was purchased as a yearling for
just $22,000.31 Of course, for every Funny Cide, there are
countless yearlings destined for the anonymity of “also rans.”
For this reason, many new buyers choose to bid on more
established thoroughbreds at the two-year-olds-in-training
auctions or mixed sales.
Before arriving at the auction, potential purchasers are
encouraged to thoroughly review the auction’s sales catalog.
The sales catalog lists information about all of the horses for
sale, including their pedigrees and hip numbers.32 Most
importantly, the sales catalog contains the auction’s Conditions
of Sale, which lists the contractual terms governing all sales at
the auction.33 Most potential owners narrow down the field of
available horses with the assistance of a bloodstock agent, who
also bids on their behalf.34 Bloodstock agents may be especially
valuable to new owners, who often lack the knowledge and
personal experience necessary to select the most promising
horses.
The horses’ medical records are usually available for
viewing in the auction’s repository.35 Some sales companies
restrict access to the repository to medical professionals, so
potential owners are encouraged to hire an equine veterinarian
to review the medical records and provide insight into the
horses’ health and fitness.36 This veterinarian should also
physically examine a horse before his client bids on it, looking
for any potential problem areas.37 Auction participants and
their agents should investigate the horses as much as possible
30

Id. at 68, 70.
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 74.
32
Every horse for sale at an auction is identified by a number affixed to its
hip. This “hip number” also reflects the order in which the horse will be brought into
the auction ring. Id. at 101.
33
The Conditions of Sale are discussed in greater detail infra Part II.B.
34
For more information about bloodstock agents and the legal issues they
present, see infra Part V.A.
35
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 54-55. Sellers have
the option of whether or not to submit medical records to the repository, so x-rays and
other information may not be available for every horse being sold at the auction. See
id. at 55.
36
Id. at 95; NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 31.
37
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 70-71.
31
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Legal Implications

Horses are considered “goods” under the Uniform
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), so thoroughbred transactions fall
under the governance of Article 2 of the U.C.C.38 Sale by
auction is also covered by the U.C.C.,39 but state auction laws
supplement its provisions.40 If a buyer feels he has been
“duped” in his purchase of a thoroughbred, the U.C.C. offers
him two forms of relief.41 The buyer may attempt to rescind his
purchase by rejecting the horse or revoking his acceptance.42
He can also sue for damages based on breach of warranty.43
Most purchasers in this situation choose to rescind the
purchase rather than sue for damages.44 A dissatisfied buyer
would not want to keep and maintain a horse that is unfit for
racing or breeding due to some undisclosed defect. If a buyer
purchases a thoroughbred for breeding purposes and then
discovers that, despite representations to the contrary, the
horse is castrated, the buyer is unlikely to keep the animal
because it is no longer of any value to him.45 It would be more

38
N. Ridge Farms, Inc. v. Trimble, No. 82-CA-1305-MR, 1983 Ky. App.
LEXIS 364, at *9 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1983); Anne I. Bandes, Saddled with a Lame
Horse? Why State Consumer Protection Laws Can Be the Best Protection for Duped
Horse Purchasers, 44 B.C. L. REV. 789, 792 (2003); John Alan Cohan, The Uniform
Commercial Code as Applied to Implied Warranties of “Merchantability” and “Fitness”
in the Sale of Horses, 73 KY. L.J. 665, 666-67 (1985); John J. Kropp, J. Jeffrey Landen
& Daniel C. Heyd, Horse Sense and the UCC: The Purchase of Racehorses, 1 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 171, 174 (1991); Cary Robertson, Thoroughbred Certificate Law: A
Proposal, 78 KY. L.J. 659, 672 (1990).
39
U.C.C. § 2-328 (1998).
40
Kropp, Landen & Heyd, supra note 38, at 177-78. “[U]nless displaced by
the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.” Id. at 178 n.36 (quoting U.C.C. §
1-103 (1972)).
41
Bandes, supra note 38, at 795.
42
Id.
43
The purchaser may seek damages in the amount of the difference between
what he paid for the horse and what the horse would have been worth if it had been as
warranted, unless special circumstances exist which lead to a different amount of
damages. Id. at 802 (citing U.C.C. § 2-714(2)).
44
Id. at 795 (citing Miller, supra note 13, at 547).
45
See Brodsky v. Nerud, 414 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (App. Div. 1979). In Brodsky v.
Nerud, a castrated horse was incorrectly listed as a colt in the program at a claiming
race. The buyer only discovered the horse was castrated once he took it home. Because
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appropriate for this particular buyer to rescind the purchase by
rejecting the horse or revoking acceptance. A buyer’s ability to
rescind his thoroughbred purchase is severely limited,
however, as most public auctions disclaim warranties as part of
their Conditions of Sale.46 An auction’s Conditions of Sale,
usually printed in the sales catalog, include the contract terms
for all horses being sold at that auction.47 The buyer, seller,
and sales company are all bound to these terms.48
As a general rule, a horse is sold “as is” at a public
auction.49 Of course, there are exceptions. Certain physical
conditions,50 which are expressly named in an auction’s
catalog,51 must be announced to potential purchasers before
he purchased the horse for breeding, it was “useless to him.” Id. For an explanation of
claiming races, see supra note 20.
46
See Cohen v. N. Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Ky. 1989). In
this case, a buyer at the Keeneland auction brought an action against the seller and
auctioneer to rescind his purchase of a colt because he later discovered that the horse
suffered from a displaced soft palate, a condition that could affect its racing ability.
The buyer’s claim for rescission failed because the Conditions of Sale, as documented in
the auction catalog, expressly disclaimed all warranties. Id. at 1269. The Conditions
of Sale read in part: “THERE IS NO WARRANTY IMPLIED BY AUCTIONEER OR
CONSIGNOR, EXCEPT AS SET FORTH HEREIN, AS TO THE MERCHANTABILITY
OR FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF ANY ANIMAL OFFERED IN
THIS SALE, ALL SALES ARE MADE ON AN AS IS BASIS, WITH ALL FAULTS.” Id.
at 1267; see also Keeneland Ass’n, Inc. v. Eamer, 830 F. Supp. 974, 986 (E.D. Ky. 1993)
(finding that Keeneland’s use of disclaimers waiving all warranties was proper and
enforceable, so buyer could not rescind his purchase after discovering the horse
suffered from leg problems). See generally U.C.C. § 2-316 (1998) (dealing with
exclusion of warranties). Even a contract that excludes all warranties may still be
enforceable. See Greg Coats Cars, Inc. v. Kasey, 576 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978).
47
Bandes, supra note 38, at 794.
48
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 44-45.
49
Id. at 47.
50
Cribbing, wobbler syndrome, and eye defects are among the conditions that
must be disclosed to potential buyers under the Conditions of Sale. Id. A “cribber” is a
horse that digs its teeth into an object (often a fence), arches its neck, and then sucks
air into its stomach. Cribbing is considered a controllable behavior, not a disease.
NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 204. Wobbler syndrome is
“a neurological disease associated with incoordination and weakness.” Id. at 211. In
order to rescind his purchase of an undisclosed “cribber” or “wobbler,” a buyer must be
able to prove that the behavior or condition existed at the time of sale. This can be
quite difficult to prove. See, e.g., Keeneland, 830 F. Supp. at 988. The buyer in
Keeneland was unable to rescind his purchase of an allegedly undisclosed cribber
because he could not prove that the horse was a cribber at the time of purchase.
Eamer, the purchaser, produced no evidence that this particular horse exhibited
cribbing behavior prior to the sale, and a veterinarian explained in an affidavit that
horses do not typically develop cribbing behavior until they are over one year old. This
horse was only seven months old when Eamer purchased it. Id.
51
The auction catalog contains information about the horses that are for sale
and also lists the Conditions of Sale. It is usually available weeks before the auction so
that prospective bidders can familiarize themselves with the process and plan on which
thoroughbreds to bid. See Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Before the

2007]

PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE

1069

bidding begins or must otherwise be disclosed by veterinary
certificates on file in the auction’s repository.52 Under the
Conditions of Sale at public thoroughbred auctions, potential
buyers have a duty to review a horse’s veterinary certificates,
x-rays, and any other medical information that is on file in the
repository before deciding whether to buy the animal.53
Buyers are also encouraged to physically examine the
thoroughbreds themselves and hire veterinarians to examine
the horses prior to purchase.54 Although the Conditions of Sale
do not require these physical examinations, a buyer cannot
rescind his thoroughbred purchase if he later discovers a defect
in the horse that he would have discovered at the auction if he
had conducted the customary examination.55 However, if an
owner later discovers that the horse he purchased at a public
auction suffers from one of the conditions that fall under the
exceptions to the warranty disclaimer, and this condition was
not disclosed at the auction, he may attempt to rescind the
purchase based on breach of warranty.56 A purchaser’s ability
to rescind is further restricted, however, as he must notify the
sales company in writing within the limited “right to return”
time frame recorded in the auction’s Conditions of Sale.57 Sales
companies give the buyer a very limited amount of time to
rescind his purchase, often just forty-eight hours after the
auction ends,58 because a horse’s physical condition is subject to
change very quickly.59
Auction: Preliminary Work, http://www.toba.org/owner-education/before-the-auction.aspx
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
52
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 47.
53
Id. at 54.
54
See, e.g., BARRETTS, supra note 2 (“Buyer acknowledges that he/she has
had the opportunity to inspect and examine, by veterinarian or otherwise, each horse
he/she has purchased and accepts any horse he/she purchases with all conditions and
defects except those which are specifically warranted in these Conditions.”);
KEENELAND THOROUGHBRED RACING & SALES, supra note 2 (“All prospective buyers
are urged to carefully examine horses in which they may be interested personally
and/or by agents or veterinarians of their choosing BEFORE bidding as they are
accepting any horse purchased with all faults, including all conditions and defects,
except for applicable limited warranties . . . .”).
55
See Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1968)
(holding that a buyer could not rescind his purchase of a horse because he passed up
the “reasonable opportunity to inspect it” before purchasing, so his rejection was
therefore not effectuated in a reasonable time); see also U.C.C. § 2-602 (1998); Cohan,
supra note 38, at 685.
56
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 47.
57
Id.
58
See KEENELAND THOROUGHBRED RACING & SALES, supra note 2.
59
See id.
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In some situations, a purchaser may even be able to
rescind a sale based on an undisclosed defect that does not fall
under the exceptions to the auction’s warranty disclaimers.60
In Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass’n, Inc., the plaintiff
successfully rescinded his purchase of a thoroughbred after
discovering the horse had a heart murmur which precluded it
Although the auction’s
from safely carrying a rider.61
Conditions of Sale had a clear disclaimer waiving warranties,
this blanket waiver did not waive the seller’s express
warranties because he made an affirmative, material
misrepresentation about the horse. The court held that the
defendant’s statement to the purchaser that the thoroughbred
was “healthy and fit for racing and breeding purposes” was an
express warranty.62 As such, the catalog’s waiver of warranties
could not disclaim the seller’s express warranty about the
horse’s condition.63
Courts may consider thoroughbred industry customs
when interpreting a sales contract.64 Individuals who are new
to horse racing, however, cannot be bound by industry customs
unless they knew of these customs or the customs were so
widespread and well-known that newcomers are presumed to
be aware of their existence.65 Trade codes like TOBA’s Code of
Ethics can assist courts in interpreting industry contracts66 by
helping to establish the existence of a specific custom.

60

If the seller has made affirmative, material representations about the
horse, his statements will constitute an express warranty, which cannot be waived by a
general disclaimer waiving all warranties. Travis v. Wash. Horse Breeders Ass’n, Inc.,
759 P.2d 418, 422 (Wash. 1988).
61
Id. at 419-20.
62
Id. at 422.
63
Id. at 421-22.
64
See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2004) (defining usage of trade as “any practice or
method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as
to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question”); see also Kropp, Landen & Heyd, supra note 38, at 183. For a detailed
account of the role of trade customs in the thoroughbred industry, see Miller, supra
note 5.
65
Miller, supra note 5, at 812.
66
See U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (2004) (showing that a written trade code can help
prove the existence of a usage of trade, but the court has the power to interpret the
provisions of the writing).
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THE UNITED KINGDOM RESPONDS TO THOROUGHBRED
SALES FRAUD: THE BLOODSTOCK INDUSTRY CODE OF
PRACTICE

From 1752 to April of 2006, horse racing conduct in the
United Kingdom was regulated by the Jockey Club, an
organization which also owned and operated thirteen
racetracks.67 The Jockey Club’s power as British horse racing’s
regulatory authority gave the organization a great deal of
control over the conduct of racing participants.68 All jockeys
and trainers who worked in the United Kingdom were required
to be licensed by the Jockey Club, and all owners of racehorses
had to be registered with the Club.69 As a result, these groups
were bound by the Club’s Rules of Racing.70
The British Jockey Club proposed its Bloodstock71
Industry Code of Practice72 on July 6, 2004,73 in response to a
highly publicized case74 involving agent bribery. In this case,
67
The Jockey Club, History and Background, http://www.thejockeyclub.co.uk/
doc.php?id=41557 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
68
See Horseracing Regulatory Authority, Powers of the HRA,
http://thehra.org/doc.php?id=9 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (explaining the HRA’s
regulatory powers, powers that were previously held by the Jockey Club) [hereinafter
Powers of the HRA]. As explained infra text accompanying notes 94-99, the Jockey
Club is no longer the regulatory authority for British horse racing. The Horseracing
Regulatory Authority (“HRA”) assumed this responsibility in April of 2006. The Jockey
Club thereafter removed from its Web site all information relating to its previous
responsibilities. Printouts from earlier versions of the Jockey Club Web site are on file
with the Brooklyn Law Review. All of the regulatory and disciplinary information once
maintained on the Jockey Club’s Web site is now located on the HRA’s Web site.
Therefore, information about duties and powers once held by the Jockey Club, but now
maintained by the HRA, is referenced to the HRA’s Web site.
69
See id.
70
Id.
71
The term “bloodstock” describes thoroughbreds that are “bred for racing.”
Equisearch.com, Glossary of Equine Terms, http://equisearch.com/advice/glossary/
glossaryB (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
72
THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10.
73
See Press Release, The Jockey Club, Landmark Code, supra note 11.
74
The original dispute in this lawsuit was not about a bloodstock agent’s
undisclosed profits. The lawsuit dealt with which party in a thoroughbred transaction
should bear the costs when the horse was injured shortly after a verbal agreement of
sale. Young thoroughbred Foodbroker Fancy was injured a few days after the parties
agreed to the sale and the deal subsequently fell through. The filly was eventually sold
to another party and this case dealt with who should be held responsible for paying
Foodbroker Fancy’s veterinary bills from the time that the original sale fell through to
the time when the horse was sold to the third party. Details of the undisclosed
“sweetener” emerged at trial, leading to strong criticism from the presiding judge and,
ultimately, a settlement. Richard Evans, Horsetrading Scandal Puts Sport of Kings
Back in Dock, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 27, 2004, Sport, at 4 [hereinafter
Evans, Horsetrading Scandal].
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leading thoroughbred trainer David Elsworth was offered a
£10,000 “sweetener” by one of Britain’s most successful
bloodstock agents, Charlie Gordon-Watson, to ensure that
promising filly Foodbroker Fancy would be sold to an American
client.75 The filly’s owners, Foodbrokers Ltd., were already
paying Elsworth a five percent commission76 and were unaware
that the trainer would also receive this additional £10,000 in
connection with the sale.77
Judge Michael Dean Q.C. of Central London County
Court criticized this practice of bloodstock agents accepting
undisclosed “sweeteners.”78 Calling these secret commissions
“quite illegal,” Judge Dean urged the bloodstock industry to
stop this practice.79 Despite the accusations of impropriety,
Gordon-Watson maintained that the additional £10,000 was
simply compensation for the loss of training fees that Elsworth
The
would have accrued had the filly not been sold.80
bloodstock agent further claimed that such payment is
Even though
customary in thoroughbred transactions.81
Gordon-Watson denied any wrongdoing, the parties eventually
settled the claim, with Gordon-Watson paying a total of
£50,000 in damages and costs to the aggrieved parties.82
Due to the involvement of such high-profile players in
the thoroughbred industry,83 this scandal caught the attention
of the British media. London’s Daily Telegraph conducted an
investigation into these horse transactions, speaking with
many industry insiders to determine exactly how prevalent this

75
Richard Evans, Jockey Club Probe Bloodstock ‘Fraud,’ DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Jan. 27, 2004, Sport, at 1 [hereinafter Evans, Jockey Club Probe]. GordonWatson was working as an agent for Richard Duggan, a California agent who wanted
to acquire Foodbroker Fancy for his own American principal. Ray Paulick, Ethics
Update, BLOODHORSE.COM, June 17, 2004, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/
article.asp?id=23015 [hereinafter Paulick, Ethics Update].
76
Trainers often serve as agents in horse transactions, and are themselves
paid the customary five percent commission. Miller, supra note 5, at 781.
77
Evans, Jockey Club Probe, supra note 75.
78
Id.
79
See Evans, Horsetrading Scandal, supra note 74.
80
Id.
81
Paulick, Ethics Update, supra note 75.
82
Gordon-Watson paid £40,000 in costs and fees to Foodbrokers Ltd. and
£10,000 to Richard Duggan, his American principal. Evans, Jockey Club Probe, supra
note 75; Paulick, Ethics Update, supra note 75.
83
Gordon-Watson purchased the 2003 Epsom Derby winner as a yearling,
and David Elsworth trained a Cheltenham Gold Cup winner. Evans, Horsetrading
Scandal, supra note 74; Evans, Jockey Club Probe, supra note 75.
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kind of deception is in the world of racehorse sales.84 The
newspaper concluded that not only are these fraudulent sales
practices widespread within the racing world,85 but this
behavior is accepted as a customary trait of the industry.86
Shortly after newspaper reports exposed the industry’s “dirty
little secret,” the Jockey Club announced a summit of various
horse racing organizations and the Federation of Bloodstock
Agents to discuss ways “to increase transparency in sales
The parties ultimately concluded that
transactions.”87
developing a code of practice governing these sales would be
the necessary first step in this process.88
Following this recommendation, the Club published its
An
Bloodstock Industry Code of Practice in July of 2004.89
agent’s duty of loyalty was central to its focus. The Code of
Practice states that an agent should not place himself in a
position where his personal interests might conflict with his
duty to his principal, and an “[a]gent shall not use his position
to obtain a secret profit.”90 It also requires an agent to disclose
if he is working for more than one principal in a transaction.91
If a vendor offers an agent “Luck Money,”92 the Code of Practice

84
See, e.g., Richard Evans, Foodbroker Case Is Just “Tip of Rotten Iceberg”: A
Lawyer Specialising in Racing Says that Some Cases Amount to Nothing but Theft,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 27, 2004, Sport, at 5 [hereinafter Evans, Foodbroker
Case]; Evans, Horsetrading Scandal, supra note 74; Evans, Jockey Club Probe, supra
note 75.
85
A similar case of agent impropriety occurred in 1999, when trainers Paul
Webber and Oliver Sherwood were accused of colluding to run up the price of a horse
that was purchased for Webber’s principal. A British court found that the parties were
guilty of fraud and awarded the principal £51,480 in damages. See Exterior Profiles,
Ltd. v. Curragh Bloodstock Agency, Ltd., 1999 WL 1611280 (Q.B.D. Nov. 12, 1999); see
also Marcus Armytage, Sherwood and Webber Fined, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar.
10, 2000, available at http://telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=/archive/2000/
03/10/soarmy10.html.
86
Evans, Horsetrading Scandal, supra note 74 (noting that some fraudulent
practices are “not regarded as anything untoward” by many British horsemen).
87
Richard Evans, Jockey Club Call Summit on Corruption, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 28, 2004, Sport, at 1 [hereinafter Evans, Jockey Club Call
Summit].
88
Press Release, The Jockey Club, Working Group Established to Develop
Bloodtsock [sic] Industry Code of Practice (Apr. 1, 2004), available at
http://thehra.org/doc.php?id=28614 [hereinafter Press Release, The Jockey Club,
Working Group Established].
89
Press Release, The Jockey Club, Landmark Code, supra note 11.
90
THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10, § 2.
91
Id. § 4.
92
The Code of Practice defines “Luck Money” as “any financial payment or
payment in kind made by or on behalf of a vendor to a Purchaser or his Agent, after the
sale of a horse has been concluded.” Id. § 6.
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requires the agent to report this to his principal and possibly
account for this money.93
On April 3, 2006, the Jockey Club transferred its
regulatory responsibilities to the Horseracing Regulatory
Authority (“HRA”).94 The goal was to separate the Jockey
Club’s commercial activity from its regulatory, licensing, and
The HRA is not entirely
disciplinary responsibilities.95
autonomous, however.96 Most of its employees worked for the
Jockey Club up until the switch, and the HRA is now
technically a division of the Club.97 The Jockey Club maintains
that this is just a temporary arrangement, necessary until
disputes over transferring pension entitlements are resolved.98
The United Kingdom aims to have a truly “independent,
professional system of regulation”99 once these disputes are
resolved and the HRA is able to split from the Jockey Club.
As the central regulatory body for British horse racing
conduct,100 the HRA is now responsible for enforcing the Code of
Practice.101 Complainants must report alleged breaches of the
Code of Practice to the HRA.102 If the Authority considers the
93

Id.
Press Release, Horseracing Regulatory Authority, An Historic Day for
Racing—The HRA Assumes Regulatory Control (Apr. 3, 2006), available at
http://thehra.org/doc.php?id=40796.
95
Marcus Armytage, HRA Takes Reins from Jockey Club, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Apr. 3, 2006, Sport, at 29.
96
Id.
97
Greg Wood, End of Era as Jockey Club Falls on Own Sword, GUARDIAN
(London), Apr. 3, 2006, Sport, at 17.
98
Id.
99
Horse Racing: High Stakes, GUARDIAN (London), July 8, 2006, Leader, at
30.
100
The HRA is responsible for regulating horse racing conduct, but the British
Horseracing Board (“BHB”) is the governing body for British horse racing. See British
Horseracing Board, What We Do, http://www.britishhorseracing.com/inside_horseracing/
about/whatwedo/default.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). They are not affiliated with
the British government, though the BHB “lead[s] the industry in dealings with the
Government.”
British Horseracing Board, What We Do: Government Liaison,
http://www.britishhorseracing.com/inside_horseracing/about/whatwedo/government.asp
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007). There are reports that the HRA and the BHB will
eventually be merged into one governance/regulation body, the British Horseracing
Authority (“BHA”). See, e.g., The Jockey Club, History and Background, supra note 67;
Press Release, Horseracing Regulatory Authority, Nic Coward Assumes Responsibility
at the HRA (Feb. 22, 2007), available at http://www.thehra.org/doc.php?id=44530.
101
E-mail from Owen Byrne, Public Relations Officer, Horseracing Regulatory
Authority, to author (Nov. 9, 2006) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
102
THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10, § 9. The HRA
emphasizes the importance of individuals with information reporting alleged breaches
of the Code of Practice, and then supplying the Authority with the evidence necessary
to support their allegations. See E-mail from Owen Byrne, supra note 101 (explaining
94
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violation to be “contrary to the integrity, proper conduct or good
reputation of horse racing,” the HRA reserves the right to ban
the violator from all British racecourses and any other premise
that the HRA licenses.103 Additionally, if the violator is licensed
or registered with the HRA, it has the power to suspend,
withdraw, or not renew his license.104 The Authority can
declare a licensed individual to be a “disqualified person,”
which “prevent[s] the individual from entering any racecourse
or being employed in a training yard,” and it can also fine
licensed individuals up to £40,000 for violations.105 Since the
HRA assumed regulation responsibilities, it has investigated
several allegations of Code of Practice violations, but none of
these complaints have resulted in disciplinary action.106
IV.

THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWS THE UNITED KINGDOM’S
LEAD: THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR THOROUGHBRED
AUCTIONS

Fraud in thoroughbred sales was also a problem across
the Atlantic. After the Jockey Club released its Code of
Practice, one of the United States’ most prominent
thoroughbred owners, Satish Sanan,107 called upon the
American industry to adopt a similar code of ethics for
bloodhorse sales.108 Sanan stressed the need for a code that
would extend beyond the United Kingdom’s Code of Practice,
including requiring disclosure of any surgeries a horse had
undergone to correct conformation109 defects and disclosure of
all medications a horse had taken.110
that such voluntary reporting is necessary because “[w]ith the bloodstock world as it is,
much is done by word of mouth rather than being committed to paper, and only
microphones on all agents, vendors and trainers or an HRA employee stood at every
stable door could enable [the HRA] to pro-actively police [sales],” and the HRA lacks
“the resources or inclination to police the sales in such a manner”).
103
THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10, § 9.
104
See Powers of the HRA, supra note 68.
105
Id.
106
E-mail from Owen Byrne, supra note 101.
107
Satish Sanan is one of the world’s top purchasers of yearlings at auction.
See Glenye Cain, Signs Point to Sanan Attending Keeneland Sale, DAILY RACING FORM,
Aug. 20, 2004 [hereinafter Cain, Signs Point to Sanan].
108
Glenye Cain, Sanan Calls for Reforms on Sales of Thoroughbreds, DAILY
RACING FORM, July 3, 2004, available at http://espn.go.com/horse/news/2004/
0703/1833924.html [hereinafter Cain, Sanan Calls for Reforms].
109
Conformation is the “overall physical appearance of a horse, reflecting the
arrangement of muscle, bone, and other body tissues.” UC DAVIS SCH. OF VETERINARY
MED., BOOK OF HORSES: A COMPLETE MEDICAL REFERENCE GUIDE FOR HORSES AND
FOALS (Mordecai Siegal ed., 1996), reprinted in TheHorse.com, Glossary of Horse
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The Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association,
whose mission is “to improve the economics, integrity and
pleasure of the sport on behalf of owners and breeders,”111
responded to Sanan’s pressure by creating the Sales Integrity
Task Force112 to investigate auction practices and recommend
ways to improve buyer confidence.113 The Task Force concluded
its investigation in December 2004.114 Its recommendations
included a new code of ethics and the use of two disclosure
forms—a contract for bloodstock agents and a form disclosing
surgical procedures undergone by a horse.115 Unveiled by
TOBA that same month, the Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred
Auctions was originally divided into four articles: “Veterinary
Practices,” “Disclosure of Ownership,” “The Role of the Agent,”
and “The Sale Company.”116
Article I of the Code addressed disclosure of medical
procedures performed on thoroughbreds. It categorized some
medical procedures as “acceptable, but must be disclosed,”117
Health Terms, http://www.thehorse.com/Glossary.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007); see
also NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 89-96 (explaining
how to examine a horse’s conformation).
110
See Cain, Sanan Calls for Reforms, supra note 108.
111
Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association Home Page,
http://www.toba.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
112
The Task Force was composed of twenty-two leading thoroughbred owners,
breeders, auction representatives, bloodstock agents, and trainers. They were divided
into subcommittees on dual agency, veterinary practices, and full disclosure. See
Glenye Cain, Breeders Take Floor in Ethics Debate, DAILY RACING FORM, Oct. 15, 2004
[hereinafter Cain, Breeders Take Floor]; Sales Integrity Program, Member List,
http://www.salesintegrity.org/memberlist.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). Sanan
served as an owner representative on the Sales Integrity Task Force. Cain, Sanan
Devotes Himself, supra note 5.
113
See Sales Integrity Task Force, Mission, http://www.salesintegrity.org/
code.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
114
Letter from the Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association to
Thoroughbred Auction Participants as Part of the Sales Integrity Program (on file with
the Brooklyn Law Review).
115
Id.
116
THOROUGHBRED OWNERS AND BREEDERS ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR
THOROUGHBRED AUCTIONS (original version), available at http://www.bloodhorse.com/
PDF/CodeOfEthics.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) [hereinafter TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS
(original version)].
117
The original Code of Ethics required disclosure of the following procedures:
Invasive joint surgeries and other surgeries designed to affect permanent
changes in a horse’s conformation. These include transphyseal bridges and
periosteal transsections, manipulations, and elevations.
These are
procedures adjudged to improve conformation of horses and thus enhance
their opportunity to remain sound under the rigors of training and racing.
The fact of them having been performed must be disclosed to all potential
buyers and buying agents.
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while banning the use of other “prohibited, unacceptable
practices.”118 For example, procedures that permanently altered
a horse’s conformation, such as invasive joint surgeries, were
deemed acceptable, but the Code required that these
procedures be disclosed at the sale.119 Procedures that altered a
horse’s conformation in order to temporarily mask defects for
the time necessary to complete the sale were labeled
“unacceptable.”120 The Code forbids sellers from performing
these temporary procedures after the horse has arrived at the
sale grounds.121 Additionally, injecting internal blisters122 to
temporarily alter a horse’s conformation is prohibited within
ninety days of the sale. Lastly, the repeated use of anabolic
steroids to artificially alter a horse’s appearance123 was overall
“discouraged.”124
Id. art. I.
118

Article I of the original Code maintained that a purchaser would be
entitled to full reimbursement if, within fourteen days after the sale, he could establish
that the horse he purchased had undergone any of these prohibited practices:
Temporary alterations which may regress and therefore mask a horse’s true
conformation or condition, for purposes of sale. These include shock wave
therapy, and acupuncture and/or electro-stimulation with the intent of
altering laryngeal function. Neither is permissible after a horse has arrived
at the sale grounds. Prohibited any time, regardless of the animal’s location,
within 90 days of sale is the injection of an internal blister or any other
substance designed to alter conformation temporarily.
Id.
119

Id. Occasionally, these hidden procedures actually benefit the purchaser.
In 1996, trainer Bob Baffert bought a colt on behalf of his friend for $17,000 (a
“bargain-basement price”). Drape, No Gift Horses Here, supra note 1. They later
discovered the colt had undergone a transphyseal bridge to straighten its knee (a
procedure which the original version of the Code categorized as “acceptable, but must
be disclosed,” see TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I).
Two years later, that horse (Real Quiet) won the Kentucky Derby and the Preakness
Stakes, missing the Triple Crown “by a nose” at the Belmont Stakes. Drape, No Gift
Horses Here, supra note 1.
120
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I.
121
Id.
122
Blistering is a procedure used to increase blood circulation in a horse’s
legs. It can be done externally by applying a caustic agent to the horse’s skin.
However, the caustic agent can also be injected beneath the horse’s skin, increasing
blood flow to the affected area. NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note
20, at 107. These injections are the “internal blisters” that the original version of the
Code outlawed within ninety days of sale. TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version),
supra note 116, art. I.
123
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I. Anabolic
steroids should be distinguished from corticosteroids, which are prescribed for
legitimate medical purposes, such as treating inflammation. In contrast, anabolic
steroids are primarily used “to keep horses eating and training aggressively” or “to
replace hormones lost in male horses after being castrated.” Racing Medication and
Testing
Consortium,
Inc.,
Questions,
http://www.rmtcnet.com/content.asp?
whatpage=QUESTIONS (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). In most other countries, anabolic
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Article II of the Code of Ethics, which discussed
disclosure of a thoroughbred’s owner, proved most contentious
for the Task Force members. An agent often bids or places
horses for sale on behalf of an unidentified principal, with the
agent’s name documented as the purchaser or seller125 and the
“true owner” remaining anonymous.
Owners may have
legitimate reasons for seeking this anonymity. For example,
wealthy business executives might not want their purchase
history accessible to their clients.126 Purchaser and seller
anonymity is respected at other kinds of auctions, like art
auctions,127 so proponents of owner privacy feel the
thoroughbred world should be treated no differently.128
Despite these justifications, many industry members,
like Satish Sanan, persistently lobbied for full disclosure of
horse ownership.129 They argued that anonymity makes it
easier for an owner to conceal arguably unethical activity, such
as bidding on one’s own horse to run up the price.130 When
drafting the Code, the Task Force balanced owners’ privacy
steroids are banned on race day. However, in most of the United States (all states
except Iowa), anabolic steroids are permitted for “therapeutic” use at both races and
sales. Pete Denk, Keeneland, Fasig-Tipton Form Committee to Address Steroids at
Sales, THOROUGHBREDTIMES.COM, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/
sales-news/2007/January/19/Keeneland-Fasig-Tipton-form-committee-to-addresssteroids-at-sales.aspx; Bill Finley, Horseracing Officials Move Toward Steroid Ban,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at D1. Use of anabolic steroids can significantly impact a
horse’s appearance. Leading trainer John Ward once purchased promising yearlings at
auction, only to find them “shriveled up like raisins” shortly thereafter, due to the
presale use of steroids. These horses, and others treated with anabolic steroids before
being sold, gradually returned to their “normal state,” “[b]ut their appearance was
overrepresented when they went through the sales ring.” Drape, No Gift Horses Here,
supra note 1 (quoting John Ward). See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text for
information about the movement to ban the use of anabolic steroids in horse racing and
sales.
124
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I.
125
See Glenye Cain, Question Remains Whether to Disclose Buyers, DAILY
RACING FORM, Sept. 16, 2004 [hereinafter Cain, Question Remains]. At the Keeneland
auction in September of 2004, a Japanese trainer/bloodstock agent purchased a colt for
$8 million on behalf of a client he declined to identify. Even Keeneland’s director of
sales was unaware of the buyer’s identity. He stated that the auction’s credit
department employees are “[t]he [only] people who need to know.” Id. (quoting
Geoffrey Russell, Director of Sales at Keeneland).
126
Campbell, supra note 19.
127
See Thane Peterson, The Art of the Auction, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 18,
2003, http://www.businessweek.com/print/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2003/nf20031118_2361_
db028.htm?chan=db (noting that most pieces for sale at Sotheby’s Contemporary Art
auction are listed only as coming “from a private collection”).
128
See Campbell, supra note 19.
129
See, e.g., Cain, Question Remains, supra note 125; Cain, Sanan Calls for
Reforms, supra note 108; Cain, Sanan Devotes Himself, supra note 5.
130
See Cain, Sanan Devotes Himself, supra note 5.
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rights with the value of full disclosure and settled on
“encouraging,” but not requiring, agents and consignors131 to
disclose the true owner.132 If they refuse to disclose these
anonymous owners, the potential purchasers’ only recourse is
“deleting the horse from further consideration.”133
Article III of the Code detailed the bloodstock agent’s
role in thoroughbred auctions.134 It emphasized that dual
agency without disclosure is “inherently fraudulent.”135 In
order to remedy this problem, the Task Force encouraged
principals to require that their agents sign the Agent
Disclosure Agreement,136 which is one of the sample forms that
the Task Force released along with the Code of Ethics. This
Agreement clearly articulates what is expected of the parties
and delineates the fiduciary duties that the agent owes to his
principal, including disclosure of any “adverse interests” that
the agent has in the transaction.137 Although TOBA lacks the
131
A consignor is a “person or agency responsible for offering a horse for sale
at auction.” AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 100.
132
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. II; see also
Cain, Ethics Code, supra note 19.

The supplying of ownership information is not held to be a requirement
under this Code of Ethics. However, all sale companies are requested to
encourage consignors and consigning agents to reveal all information about
ownership which a prospective buyer or buyer’s agent might seek, both on the
catalogue page and verbally. The prospective buyer has every right to ask
the consignor anything relative to the horse’s condition and ownership, and if
such information is unsatisfactory, he/she has the recourse of deleting the
horse from further consideration. Also, prospective buyers, especially those
new to the industry, should be informed of the commercial products available
which provide some of this information. Following the sale, the sale company
will make every effort to provide to the public the most complete and accurate
information on buyers and sellers possible, consistent with the above cited
protections of privacy.
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. II.
133
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. II.
134
Id. art. III.
135
Id.
136
Id.;
Sales
Integrity
Program,
Agent
Disclosure
Agreement,
http://www.salesintegrity.org/downloads/disclosure.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter Agent Disclosure Agreement].
137
The Agent Disclosure Agreement reads in part:
AGENT acknowledges that AGENT acts as BUYER’s fiduciary with respect
to its obligations under this AGREEMENT. The following acts or omissions,
but not limited to these acts and omissions, shall constitute a breach of
AGENT’S fiduciary duties to BUYER: (a) communicating any false or
misleading information to BUYER regarding any horse under BUYER’s
consideration as recommended by AGENT; (b) failing to disclose to BUYER
the true price at which any horse under consideration by BUYER has been
offered for sale at the auction; (c) arranging with any person or persons to bid
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authority to punish an agent who signs the Agent Disclosure
Agreement and then violates its provisions, the document
would serve as strong evidentiary support for a buyer’s breach
of fiduciary duty claim against the agent.138
Finally, Article IV of the Code of Ethics articulated
TOBA’s plan to have a copy of the Code displayed at every
auction and to cooperate with sales companies to make
information about horse sales more readily available for
auction participants.139 To ensure that information about the
Code of Ethics is easily accessible to all interested parties, the
Task Force mailed packets of information to registered
thoroughbred owners and those who had recently applied for
credit at the major auction companies, and also developed
public service announcements to run at the auctions.140 The
Task Force also distributed copies of the Code and the Agent
Disclosure Agreement to the sales companies so that both
documents would be available for buyers and their agents at
the auctions.141
V.

HURDLES TO ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL
BARRIERS TO ETHICS OVERHAUL

On August 5, 2005, TOBA announced that it was
postponing implementation of Article I: Veterinary Practices.142

on a horse for BUYER at an inflated price; (d) entering into any other
agreement with any person with respect to any transaction involving the sale
of a horse to BUYER, other than an agreement which has been fully disclosed
to BUYER and which BUYER has consented to in writing; or, (e) failing to
disclose to BUYER any ownership interest of AGENT in any horse BUYER
has under consideration; (f) otherwise acting in any manner contrary to the
best interests of BUYER.
Agent Disclosure Agreement, supra note 136.
138
Sales
Integrity
Task
Force
Releases
Code
of
Ethics,
THOROUGHBREDTIMES.COM, Dec. 16, 2004, http://www.thoroughbredtimes.com/
national-news/2004/December/16/Sales-Integrity-Task-Force-releases-code-of-ethics.aspx.
Cot Campbell explains, “We can’t put someone in jail, but if someone signs this
agreement and breaches it, then legal action can be taken.” Id.
139
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. IV.
140
See Deirdre B. Biles, Sales Integrity Program Committee Addresses
Concerns
over
Surgery
Disclosure,
BLOODHORSE.COM,
Aug.
1,
2005,
http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=29312 [hereinafter Biles, Sales
Integrity Program].
141
See Deirdre B. Biles, Education on Sale Code of Ethics to Start at FasigTipton Calder Sale, BLOODHORSE.COM, Feb. 25, 2005, http://auctions.bloodhorse.com/
viewstory.asp?id=26872 [hereinafter Biles, Education on Sale].
142
Press Release, Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Mandatory
Disclosure of Vet Practices Postponed (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.bloodhorse.com/
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The Task Force completely removed this Article (and any
mention of it) from the official Code on its Web site.143 The
“postponement” came after consignors voiced their concern
with how the thoroughbred auction industry could keep track
This surprise
of so many horses’ medical histories.144
announcement seemed to confirm some industry insiders’
criticism that the Code’s drafters never really thought through
how to enforce its provisions.145
Although the Code of Ethics was largely well-received in
the thoroughbred industry,146 its positive reception was
tempered by a pervasive lack of confidence that these new rules
could actually change the way bloodstock transactions had
Critics questioned what real
always been conducted.147
penalties Code violators faced and whether TOBA or its Task
Force possessed any legitimate authority to administer these
disciplinary provisions.148 After all, the Code never refers to
punishment for violations.149 It does not even mention where to
report alleged violations.150 Since TOBA developed the Code, it
would be reasonable to assume that complainants should
report violations to the Association, just as violations of the
British Code of Practice are to be reported to the HRA.151 The
Code of Ethics, however, expressly limits TOBA’s role to
“making
relevant
forms
and
publications
readily
articleindex/article.asp?id=29376 [hereinafter Press Release, TOBA, Mandatory
Disclosure].
143
Compare TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12, with TOBA, CODE OF
ETHICS (original version), supra note 116 (showing that the veterinary practices
provisions from the original Code of Ethics are removed in the updated version).
Article I of the Code of Ethics (original version) has yet to be reinstated, and there is no
evidence that TOBA intends to do so in the future.
144
Biles, Sales Integrity Program, supra note 140. “Issues and concerns
raised include development of an effective record-keeping process at veterinary clinics,
and development of a centralized database to capture and maintain the information.”
Press Release, TOBA, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 142.
145
See Campbell, supra note 19.
146
See, e.g., Marcus Green, Fasig-Tipton Sale Puts Ethics Code to Test,
COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), July 19, 2005, at 1D (noting that the Code of Ethics
“appears to be working”).
147
See, e.g., Rachel Pagones, Bloodstock Desk: Ethics Code a Long Time
Coming, but Will It Work?, RACING POST, Dec. 17, 2004, Sport, at 17 (pointing out that
“ethical people will already be abiding by [these] guidelines”).
148
See supra note 19.
149
See TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12.
150
See id.
151
See THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 10 (explaining the
procedure for reporting breaches of the Code of Practice); see also E-mail from Owen
Byrne, supra note 101 (confirming that individuals with information should now report
violations of the Code of Practice to the HRA).
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available . . . and providing other guidance to facilitate an
owner’s due diligence and successful participation in an
auction.”152 With no official body to investigate Code violations,
and no stated penalties for these violations, critics were left
wondering how the Code could possibly correct fraudulent
auction practices.153
The Task Force’s decision to “encourage,”154 but not
require, full ownership disclosure was another major point of
contention for the detractors, especially horse sellers. As one
consignor explained, “They want the sellers to reveal
everything that has been done to a horse, but the buyers get to
conduct their business under a veil of secrecy.”155 Privacy
rights ultimately prevailed over the need for full ownership
disclosure, but it is clear that the problems Satish Sanan
articulated about anonymous sellers156 are not based on
abstract fear, but rather, an informed sense of how unethical
bidding has become customary auction practice. Since the
Code of Ethics does not require full ownership disclosure, an
agent can easily bid on his principal’s horse to run up the
purchase price without being detected. Even though the
Conditions of Sale expressly permit bi-bidding,157 the buyer
bidding against the seller’s agent might be interested to know
that the other “bidder” only intends to run up the price.
One article entitled A Beginner’s Guide to Selling
Thoroughbred Horses in a Public Auction Setting actually
encourages new owners to bid on their own horse to run up the
price.158 This article explains that “some people view consigned

152

TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Tom LaMarra, Sanan: Regulation of Sales Business Needs ‘Teeth,’
BLOODHORSE.COM, July 4, 2004, http://news.bloodhorse.com/viewstory.asp?id=23256
(arguing that, without enforcement provisions, the Code of Ethics is just a set of
conditions that will go unread and unenforced).
154
TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I.
155
Deirdre B. Biles, Code of Ethics Follow-Through Called Critical,
BLOODHORSE.COM,
Dec.
27,
2004,
http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/
article.asp?id=25948 [hereinafter Biles, Code of Ethics]. Note that this statement was
made before TOBA announced it was postponing mandatory disclosure of medical
procedures. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
156
See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
157
See supra note 2.
158
See Jonathan F. Wallace & Allen F. Wysocki, A Beginner’s Guide to Selling
Thoroughbred Horses in a Public Auction Setting 3 (Inst. of Food & Agric. Sci., Univ. of
Fla., 2000), available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/SN/SN00500.pdf. It is worth
noting that one of only two sources cited by Wallace and Wysocki is Lightning in a Jar
by Cot Campbell, Chairman of the Sales Integrity Task Force. See id. at 4.
153
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bidding as unethical, even though the rules clearly permit it.”159
This is precisely the problem. The “rules” do not address the
fraud that pervades many equine sales. It seems hypocritical
for the industry to discourage misrepresentation of horses at
public auction,160 yet allow owners to artificially manipulate the
horses’ market value in other ways. By allowing fraud to
become custom,161 the thoroughbred industry has perpetuated
its own flaws, rather than acknowledging and extinguishing
them. The Code of Ethics is a step in the right direction, but
the American horse racing community has a long way to go
before it has a truly effective system of auction regulation.
A.

Agency and Thoroughbred Auctions

By its very nature, agency raises ethical issues.162 An
agent is a fiduciary of his principal; therefore, he has a duty of
loyalty to his principal which requires that he act solely in his
principal’s best interest.163 Although agents are obligated to
work exclusively for their principals’ interests, they may have
their own countervailing interests in these transactions.164 An
agent breaches his fiduciary duty to his principal when he
places these personal interests above those of his principal.165
159

Id. at 3.
See TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS (original version), supra note 116, art. I.
161
In Bexwell v. Christie, (1776) 1 Cowp. 395, a dispute over the sale of a
gelding at auction, Lord Mansfield spoke out against sellers hiring “puffers” to run up
the purchase price of the goods for sale:
160

The matter in question is in itself of small value; but in respect of the
principles by which it must be governed, it is a matter of great
importance. . . . [T]ricks and practices of this kind daily increase, and grow so
frequent that good men give into the ways of the bad and dishonest in their
own defence. But such a practice was never openly avowed. An owner of
goods set up to sale at an auction never yet bid in the room for himself. If
such a practice were allowed, no one would bid. It is a fraud upon the sale
and upon the public. . . . [I]t is no argument to say it is a frequent custom.
2 SAMUEL LIVERMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT AND OF SALES
BY AUCTION 337-38 (1818) (emphasis added) (quoting Bexwell, 1 Cowp. at 395).
162
See Ronald F. Dushka, Why Be a Loyal Agent? A Systemic Ethical
Analysis, in ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY 143, 143 (Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward
Freeman eds., 1992).
163
Jeswald W. Salacuse, Law and Power in Agency Relationships, in
NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS: ADVICE TO LAWYERS, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES,
SPORTS AGENTS, DIPLOMATS, POLITICIANS, AND EVERYBODY ELSE 157, 158-59 (Robert
H. Mnookin & Lawrence E. Susskind eds., 1999).
164
Id.
165
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (“Unless otherwise
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the
principal in all matters connected with his agency.”).
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An agent’s duty of loyalty is particularly complicated by
the reality of American thoroughbred auctions. In the United
States, bloodstock agents are typically involved in more than
one sale at an auction.166 Although an agent may be bidding on
behalf of one client, “more than likely [he] also has horses [at
the auction] to sell.”167 For example, one owner’s purchasing
agent might also be employed as the selling agent for another
thoroughbred owner, or this agent might even be selling his
own horses at the auction. This situation is not inherently
fraudulent, but it creates a conflict of interest which the agent
is obligated to disclose to his principal.168 This conflict is the
“paradox of agency in the market system.”169 Society needs
agents to operate on others’ behalf,170 yet the very structure of
the principal/agent relationship fosters self-interested
behavior.171
This “paradox” proves especially relevant in the world of
thoroughbred sales. “The role of bloodstock agent is based on
trust. However, it also is a highly ambiguous role. It is
associated with a degree of skullduggery and chicanery. It is
not quite criminal (although in some cases it has been), but it
takes place at the margins of acceptable behavior.”172 Many of
the purchasers at today’s auctions are new to the industry.173
Therefore, they often lack the auction experience and equine
knowledge necessary to effectuate the most advantageous
purchases.174 At the very least, novice buyers, many of whom
are successful in other business ventures,175 probably lack the
166

See AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 69.
Id.
168
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387.
169
Dushka, supra note 162, at 144.
170
“Agency makes it possible for . . . actors to expand the range of their
economic activities by increasing the number of transactions that they can complete
within a given time.” Id. (quoting BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
334 (Michael J. Metzger et al. eds., 6th ed. 1986)).
171
Id.
172
Rebecca Cassidy, Falling in Love with Horses: The International
Thoroughbred Auction, 13 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 51, 53 (2005) (comparing bloodstock agents
to the “trickster” figures in anthropology).
173
See Miller, supra note 5, at 789; see also Paul Pringle, To Race, She Had to
Pony Up, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 2006, at 1 (referring to horse racing as “a $26-billion-ayear industry that depends on drawing fresh ranks of amateurs to auction stables”).
174
See Bandes, supra note 38, at 789 (citing Dennis Tilton, Fraud in the Sale
of a Show Horse, 39 AM. JUR. TRIALS 527, 541 (1989)).
175
Miller, supra note 5, at 789. Thoroughbred owner Jess Jackson, now
pursuing a lawsuit in California based on his agents’ secret commissions, see infra text
accompanying notes 188-96, made billions of dollars in the wine business before
entering the thoroughbred industry. See Drape, A Horseman’s Lawsuit, supra note 4.
167
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time to fully educate themselves about horses and the
thoroughbred market.176 To combat their equine ignorance,
most new buyers seek the assistance of knowledgeable,
experienced horsemen, a practice that seems to be
recommended by every “new buyer” guide available.177 These
new buyers typically hire bloodstock agents to select horses
and do the actual bidding for them at auction. The agents’
experience, knowledge, and time make up for what their novice
clients lack.
What many of these new buyers do not lack, however, is
dispensable income with which to purchase their first
The temptation to exploit wealthy, novice
racehorses.178
principals’ inexperience can prove to be too great for some
unscrupulous bloodstock agents.179 In one illustrative case,
experienced horseman Richard Shockey approached Paul
Gussin and his son Frederic and suggested that they purchase
a thoroughbred.180 Neither of the Gussins had any experience
with horses or racing, but Shockey offered to advise them on
details such as which racehorses to buy, how to care for them,
Another prominent owner bringing fraud claims against his former agents, James
McIngvale, known as “Mattress Mac,” first made his fortune as a furniture retailer.
See Ray Paulick, Strange Bedfellows, BLOODHORSE.COM, Sept. 12, 2006,
http://opinions.bloodhorse.com/ viewstory.asp?id=35285.
176
As one veteran horse owner observed, “You see it over and over . . . . People
who are successful in other businesses come in with ‘victim’ written across their
foreheads.”
Tom LaMarra, Panel: Ethics Code for Horse Sales Needs Teeth,
BLOODHORSE.COM,
Dec.
9,
2004,
http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/
article.asp?id=25743 (quoting Joe Harper, President of the Del Mar Thoroughbred
Club).
177
See, e.g., AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 67 (“Your
mantra should be simply: Don’t go it alone.”); BRIT. HORSERACING BD., THE THRILL OF
OWNERSHIP:
A
PRACTICAL
GUIDE
TO
OWNING
A
RACEHORSE
13,
http://www.britishhorseracing.com/owning_breeding/ownership/BHB_Practical_Guide.
pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (advising novice owners that “it is important to enlist
the support of a trainer or bloodstock agent” when purchasing a racehorse, because
“[t]he quality of advice you receive at this stage is likely to have a major influence in
your future success”); Keeneland Thoroughbred Racing & Sales, How to Bid at the
Sale, http://ww2.keeneland.com/sales/lists/copy/bid.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007)
(encouraging potential bidders “to find a qualified bloodstock advisor” before
undertaking the “unique task” of buying a horse at auction); ARNOLD KIRKPATRICK,
INVESTING IN THOROUGHBREDS 47 (2001) (“You may be Albert Einstein in the building
business or the rag trade, but you’re going to need help in the Thoroughbred
Business.”); NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 21 (warning
newcomers to overcome the urge to select their horses without assistance, because
“novice owners who go it alone risk setbacks and even failure”).
178
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
179
See AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 56 (“Many an
eager newcomer has fallen victim to unscrupulous characters sometimes acting on
their own or in concert with sellers.”).
180
Gussin v. Shockey, 725 F. Supp. 271, 272-73 (D. Md. 1989).
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and how to go about selling them.181 In exchange for the
services provided by his twenty years of experience in the
thoroughbred industry,182 Shockey was to receive five percent of
the net profits from these horse transactions.183 Unbeknownst
to the Gussins, Shockey made arrangements with the sellers
wherein he kept all money paid by the Gussins that was above
a set price determined by the seller and Shockey.184 The
Gussins eventually discovered Shockey’s secret profits and
sued him for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.185 Although
Shockey maintained that he was not acting as the Gussins’
“formal” agent,186 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland disagreed, finding that he violated his fiduciary duty
to the Gussins by failing to disclose the “kickbacks” he
received.187
An agent’s secret commissions are also at the forefront
of a high-profile lawsuit now pending in California Superior
Court in San Diego.188 Billionaire Jess Jackson,189 owner of
Kendall-Jackson Vineyard Estates, sued his three bloodstock
agents/advisors for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of
fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment in connection with the
purchase of several racehorses.190 Jackson, who has spent tens
of millions of dollars on thoroughbreds since entering the
industry in 2003,191 alleges that his advisors “obtained secret
181

Id.
Id. at 272.
183
Id. at 273.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 272. The Gussins also alleged that Shockey violated the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), based on a partnership that Paul
and Frederic Gussin had formed to handle their horse business. Shockey had only a
tenuous association with this partnership, however, since he purchased horses for the
Gussins as individuals, not for their partnership. The court granted Shockey’s motion
for summary judgment on the RICO claim, concluding that the Gussins’ partnership
was “neither the object nor the tool” of the alleged illegal conduct, as required for a
RICO violation. Id. at 276-77.
186
Gussin, 725 F. Supp. at 273.
187
Id. at 275.
188
Bessie Gregory, Bloodstock Desk: US Owner Files Law Suit Against
Former Advisors, RACING POST, Oct. 10, 2005, Sport, at 19.
189
Forbes has listed Jackson as one of the world’s richest people for the past
several years. The magazine recently estimated his wealth at $2.2 billion. Luisa Kroll
& Allison Fass, The World’s Billionaires, FORBES, Mar. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/10/07billionaires_The-Worlds-Billionaires_Name
HTML.html.
190
Gregory, supra note 188; Ray Paulick, Owner Jackson Files Suit Against
Ex-Advisors, BLOODHORSE.COM, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/
article.asp?id=30354 [hereinafter Paulick, Owner Jackson Files Suit].
191
Paulick, Owner Jackson Files Suit, supra note 190.
182
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commissions, payments, or profits or other things of value from
consignors, sellers, or other agents in return for assuring that
[he] would purchase their horses or interests in horses at
inflated prices.”192 Jackson claims that his bloodstock agents
reported inflated purchase prices for thoroughbreds they
bought on his behalf,193 pocketing the difference between the
amount Jackson paid and the actual sale prices.194 In some of
these transactions, the seller allegedly colluded with Jackson’s
agents to artificially inflate the purchase price.195 These “secret
commissions” totaled approximately $3.2 million,196 according to
the complaint.
With his case still pending, Jackson backed a bill filed
on January 24, 2006 in the Kentucky House of Representatives
by Representative Denver Butler of Louisville.197 This bill
focused on preventing fraud by agents involved in the purchase
and sale of horses.198 Similar to TOBA’s Code of Ethics, the bill
prohibits agents from taking secret commissions and makes it
illegal for an agent to represent both the buyer and the seller
without their knowledge and written consent.199 Kentucky
Governor Ernie Fletcher signed the bill into law on March 28,
2006.200

192

Id.
The alleged violations of fiduciary duty dealt with purchases both at public
auction and private sales. Id.
194
See Gregory, supra note 188; Paulick, Owner Jackson Files Suit, supra
note 190. In one transaction, bloodstock agent Emmanuel de Seroux told Jackson that
he purchased a colt for $850,000; however, the seller only received $675,000. Id.
195
At the Keeneland auction in September of 2004, Jackson paid $450,000 for
a yearling, but his suit alleges that his agent, trainer Bruce Headley, received an
undisclosed commission from the thoroughbred’s consignor. Paulick, Owner Jackson
Files Suit, supra note 190.
196
Id.
197
Ray Paulick, Bill Would Seek to Protect Kentucky Horse Buyers,
BLOODHORSE.COM, Jan. 25, 2006, http://news.bloodhorse.com/viewstory.asp?id=31915
[hereinafter Paulick, Bill Would Seek to Protect]. The legislation applies not only to
thoroughbreds, but to all breeds of horses, as long as the horse in question is “used for
racing or showing.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 230.357(1) (West 2006).
198
See H.R. 446 (Ky. 2006), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/06RS/
HB446/bill.doc; Paulick, Bill Would Seek to Protect, supra note 197.
199
See H.R. 446, supra note 198.
200
Dual Agency Bill Signed by Kentucky Governor, BLOODHORSE.COM, Mar.
28, 2006, http://www.bloodhorse.com/articleindex/article.asp?id=32772.
193
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Unlike insurance201 and real estate agents,202 bloodstock
agents do not have to be licensed by the state, or even a specific
organization, to purchase and sell horses for their clients.203
Bloodstock agents do not even need written agreements with
their principals that expressly authorize them to bid or sell on
the owners’ behalf.204 Since essentially anyone can become a
bloodstock agent,205 new buyers have no assurance that the
agents they choose are as experienced or successful as they
claim. Reputation is crucial to this industry, but these novices
usually lack sufficient industry contacts to fully investigate the
agent’s credibility in the racing world. As a result, it is not
uncommon for new horse owners to be taken advantage of by
their agents. The Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions
spotlights the risk of bloodstock agent fraud, but the Code has
no provisions to punish agents or compensate owners once this
fraud has occurred.
B.

Who Is in Charge?: How the Structure of the American
Thoroughbred Industry Cripples Its Attempts at
Regulation
1. The British System of Regulation

In the United Kingdom, the HRA has a great deal of
authority over the conduct of trainers and owners, whom the
HRA must license and register, respectively.206 Upon licensing
201

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Insurance Sales
Agents, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2006-07 EDITION, available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos118.htm (showing that insurance agents “must obtain a
license in the States where they plan to do their selling”).
202
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Real Estate Brokers
and Sales Agents, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 2006-07 EDITION, available
at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos120.htm (showing that a real estate license “is required in
every State and the District of Columbia”).
203
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO AUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 50.
204
In Gussin v. Shockey, Shockey “was reluctant to characterize his role as
that of a formal agent of the Gussins.” Gussin, 725 F. Supp. at 273. However, based on
the services he provided for the Gussins and the documents he executed on their
behalf, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland held that Shockey was
operating as an agent for the Gussins. Id.
205
See Miller, supra note 5, at 825 (noting that in order to be considered a
bloodstock agent, “[o]ne need only declare himself or herself to be a bloodstock agent”).
206
See Powers of the HRA, supra note 68. British lawyer Justin Wadham,
who specializes in horsetrading issues, explains: “With trainers, [the Code of Practice]
has everything it needs. Not only is there a code of conduct but every trainer has to
apply for a new licence annually. There’s every opportunity for the Jockey Club
repeatedly to warn trainers of the dire consequences of financial impropriety.” Evans,
Foodbroker Case, supra note 84.
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or registration, these trainers and owners agree to be bound by
the HRA’s Rules of Racing.207 However, British bloodstock
agents are not licensed or registered, so they cannot be bound
by the Rules of Racing.208 Unlike the disciplinary measures the
HRA can take against unscrupulous trainers or owners, such
as imposing fines and revoking licenses, the British horse
racing industry’s ability to directly penalize bloodstock agents
is somewhat limited.209 The Federation of Bloodstock Agents
itself has a Code of Working Ethics banning such practices;210
however, much like TOBA, membership in the Federation is
optional. Many of the most successful agents are not even
members;211 thus, they cannot be charged with violations of the
Federation’s Code.
Although the HRA lacks direct authority over agents
(assuming the agents are not licensed as trainers) and other
unlicensed individuals, violating the Code of Practice could still
prove disastrous for their careers since the HRA licenses all
Rule 2(v) of the Rules of Racing
British racecourses.212
empowers the HRA to exclude any person from any of the
HRA’s licensed premises, even those people whom the HRA
does not license or register.213 Thus, even though the HRA
cannot directly bar these unlicensed violators from working as
bloodstock agents in the future, it can banish them from all
British racecourses, making it nearly impossible for these
violators to ever again obtain employment in horse racing.214
207

See Powers of the HRA, supra note 68.
See id.
209
See id.
210
FED’N OF BLOODSTOCK AGENTS, CODE OF WORKING ETHICS (2006),
available at http://www.race-horses.com/agents/fba/fba_guidelines.htm.
211
For example, Charlie Gordon-Watson, the bloodstock agent accused of
accepting kickbacks in the sale of Foodbroker Fancy, see supra notes 74-83 and
accompanying text, is not a member of the Federation of Bloodstock Agents. Evans,
Horsetrading Scandal, supra note 74.
212
See Horseracing Regulatory Authority, About the Horseracing Regulatory
Authority, http://www.thehra.org/doc.php?id=2 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
213
RULES OF RACING R. 2(v) (2006), available at http://www.thehra.org/
pdf.php?id=44657&filename=orders_and_rules_of_racing; Powers of the HRA, supra
note 68.
214
Richard Evans, Bloodstock Crackdown, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar.
22, 2004 (noting that, although the Jockey Club could not actually prevent violators
from attending the auctions and purchasing horses, the publicity surrounding their
punishment in the racing world and in news media would “render them pariahs in
racing circles”). It is important to note that individuals may also be excluded from
racetracks in the United States. However, American thoroughbred racetracks are
licensed by the state, not TOBA. Therefore, unlike violations of the Code of Practice in
the United Kingdom, Code of Ethics violations are unlikely to result in exclusion. For a
208
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2. The American System of Regulation
The American thoroughbred industry lacks a regulatory
body comparable to the United Kingdom’s HRA or its
predecessor, the Jockey Club. TOBA is a well-respected
association with great influence, but it is merely a trade
association215 without licensing or registration authority.
Membership in TOBA is purely optional for owners and
breeders and bestows no special benefits,216 the loss of which
might deter the fraudulent activity prohibited by the Code of
Ethics. The United States has its own Jockey Club, but the
American Jockey Club does not serve the regulatory purpose
once maintained by its United Kingdom counterpart.217
Although it did, at one time, police thoroughbred racing,218 the
U.S. Jockey Club is now mainly responsible for maintaining
The American Stud Book, a thoroughbred registry.219
Although “secret commissions” and “kickbacks” are
themselves prohibited by law,220 with the court usually ordering
the unscrupulous agent to hand over the illegal profits to his
principal,221 simple mathematics show why even the law cannot
detailed account of racetrack exclusion in the United States, see John J. Kropp, J.
Jeffrey Landen & Monica A. Donath, Exclusion of Patrons and Horsemen from
Racetracks: A Legal, Practical and Constitutional Dilemma, 74 KY. L.J. 739 (1986).
215
Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association, TOBA Membership,
http://www.toba.org/membership (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
216
The benefits of TOBA membership include a membership directory,
discounts on seminars, free admission to certain racetrack clubhouses, and a free
magazine subscription. Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Member Benefits,
http://www.toba.org/membership/benefits.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
217
See
The
Jockey
Club
(U.S.),
About
the
Jockey
Club,
http://www.jockeyclub.com/about_TJC.asp [hereinafter The Jockey Club (U.S.), About
the Jockey Club] (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
218
BARNEY NAGLER, THE AMERICAN HORSE 106 (1966).
219
This registry documents all thoroughbred foals born in the United States,
Canada, and Puerto Rico, as well as some horses imported into these countries. The
Jockey Club (U.S.), About the Jockey Club, supra note 217.
220
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (explaining that agents have
a duty to give their principals any profits arising from their agency, unless the parties
have agreed otherwise). There may also be criminal repercussions for offering or
accepting a secret commission. For example, New York’s misdemeanor “commercial
bribery” statutes prohibit an individual from offering a benefit to an agent without the
principal’s consent, and prohibit an agent from soliciting or accepting such benefit,
with the intent to influence the agent’s conduct in regards to his principal’s affairs.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 180.00, 180.05 (McKinney 2006). If the benefit conferred on or
offered to the agent exceeds $1,000 and causes the principal at least $250 in economic
harm, the bribery becomes a felony. Id. §§ 180.03, 180.08; Miller, supra note 5, at 827.
221
“If an agent receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of
loyalty to the principal, he is subject to a liability to deliver it, its value, or its proceeds,
to the principal.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 (1958).
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effectively deter these deceptive practices. If a bloodstock
agent takes a “kickback” in several or all of his thoroughbred
transactions, he is unlikely to be caught for each one.
Therefore, even if his fraud was detected and prosecuted in a
few of those transactions, requiring him to disgorge these
profits to his principal, the deceptive agent is still likely to
come out on top.222
Without a regulatory body like the Horseracing
Regulatory Authority to implement and enforce its provisions,
TOBA’s Code of Ethics is more of an empty promise than an
assurance of fairness. A code of ethics without a means of
enforcement is essentially meaningless.223 In order to be
effective, codes of ethics must be clear and detailed, with
carefully delineated repercussions.224 The process of reporting
the complaint and the steps taken to investigate the complaint
must be explicitly conveyed in the code,225 or else its provisions
are little more than a statement of ideals to which industry
members claim to aspire.226
If the overt penalties for contravention of codes are minimalist, the
appearance can be given of the codes being window-dressing,
intended to promote . . . rhetoric . . . but not in a meaningful sense to
address professional abuses. . . . [T]he absence of effective sanctions
for non-compliance with ethical prescriptions significantly detracts
from their value.
Inherent in this interpretation is the
222
Agents who breach their fiduciary duties not only have to turn over any
“kickbacks” or otherwise illegal profits, they also lose the commission originally agreed
upon with their principal.

An agent is entitled to no compensation for conduct which is disobedient or
which is a breach of his duty of loyalty; if such conduct constitutes a wilful
and deliberate breach of his contract of service, he is not entitled to
compensation even for properly performed services for which no
compensation is apportioned.
Id. § 469.
223
“A code is merely a piece of paper with words if penalties for noncompliance are not applied.” Margaret M. Coady, The Moral Domain of Professionals,
in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 28, 48 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Bloch
eds., 1996) (quoting JACK M. BEHRMAN, ESSAYS ON ETHICS IN BUSINESS AND THE
PROFESSIONS 155 (1988)); see also NAT’L CONSUMER COUNCIL (U.K.), MODELS OF SELFREGULATION: AN OVERVIEW OF MODELS IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS 16 (2000),
available at http://www.ncc.org.uk/regulation/models_self_regulation.pdf (identifying
the three elements common to most forms of regulation: rules, “monitoring and
enforcement of the rules,” and a redress system, and noting that “unless all three
[elements] are covered somehow, the regulation is unlikely to be effective”).
224
See Judith Lichtenberg, What Are Codes of Ethics For?, in CODES OF
ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 223, at 13, 27.
225
See Loane Skene, A Legal Perspective on Codes of Ethics, in CODES OF
ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 223, at 111, 115.
226
See id. at 129.
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instrumentalist notion that the value of codes lies not so much in
their articulation of ideal standards of conduct but in their capacity
to regulate unsatisfactory conduct.227

It is very easy for the thoroughbred industry to speak out
against the fraudulent activity occurring at its auctions. The
real test of a firm commitment to improvement lies in
implementation of these asserted ideals.228
VI.

IS THERE ANY HOPE FOR TOBA’S “TOOTHLESS TIGER?”

If all TOBA sought to achieve by developing the Code
was improving the horse racing industry’s public image, then
arguably, it has achieved that minor aspiration. At the very
least, the Code of Ethics makes it clear that the American
thoroughbred industry (at least those members represented in
TOBA) is aware of fraud in horse sales and has asserted its
Novice owners might feel more confident
disapproval.229
entering the intimidating world of thoroughbred auctions if
they feel that someone is looking out for their best interests by
spotlighting potential problem areas.
TOBA is clearly
concerned with the effect that this fraud could have on novice
horsemen,230 whose inexperience already places them at a
disadvantage when entering the competitive world of
thoroughbred racing. If TOBA just hopes to quell new owners’
fears about an inherently unfair thoroughbred market, to
assure that these novices will continue to invest, then the Code
is, arguably, sufficient. Just as in the stock market, no one
would invest in thoroughbred racing if the market was
There must be some assurance, some way of
unfair.231
guaranteeing that what is for sale is being accurately
represented. For some new owners, perhaps TOBA’s Code of

227
Ian Freckelton, Enforcement of Ethics, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE
PROFESSIONS, supra note 223, at 130, 143-44 (footnote omitted) (describing what
Freckelton refers to as the “legalistic” approach to codes of ethics).
228
See id.
229
See generally TOBA, CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 12.
230
See Sales Integrity Task Force, Mission, supra note 113 (“The project was
specifically geared to the needs of new investors . . . .”); see also Dan Liebman &
Deirdre B. Biles, Code of Ethics for Auctions Announced, BLOODHORSE.COM, Dec. 17,
2004 (“Our mission in all of this was . . . to create a road map for the new buyer and let
him know what he should expect and what is not acceptable.” (quoting Cot Campbell)).
231
See, e.g., 2 LIVERMORE, supra note 161, at 337-38 (warning that if public
auctions tolerated fraudulent bidding practices, “no one would bid” (quoting Bexwell v.
Christie, (1776) 1 Cowp. 395)).
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Ethics provides that necessary reassurance that the racehorse
industry will not stand for a fraudulent marketplace.
This assurance is necessary for the industry to maintain
its allure of elusive victory, the promise that every individual
has a full and fair opportunity to participate and win.232 This is
what lures new investors to both the thoroughbred market and
the stock market. In each industry, however, the odds are not
in the newcomer’s favor. There will always be players with
more information, more experience, and more skill. Investing
in any competitive market brings no assurance of success.233
No investor can be guaranteed that his stock is going to
increase in value, just as no thoroughbred buyer can be certain
that his colt will be the next Secretariat.234 If the Code
convinces these new owners, however, that they will at least
have a fair chance of “getting what they paid for,” then it has
successfully improved the industry’s reputation and restored
newcomers’ faith.
Of course, if TOBA has no intention of actually
enforcing its Code of Ethics, the Code is really only giving these
newcomers false hope. False hope might lure new investors
into the market, but it cannot keep them there.235 If, however,
TOBA released the Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions
to actually improve auction practices or at least make the
232
See, e.g., NEW THOROUGHBRED OWNERS HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 7
(“What thrill can match the sight of your horse, bearing a jockey in the colors and
design you have chosen, blazing through the last furlong of a race and snatching
victory at the finish line? Life doesn’t get much better.”). Romanticized tales of “rags
to riches” victories proliferate this elusive dream. “The thing about this game is you
can get in it. You don’t need a million dollars. We did it. The small guys can do it.
Anybody can do it.” Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Ass’n, Thoroughbred
Ownership (quoting Mike Goetz, co-owner of a Grade 1 winner) (on file with the
Brooklyn Law Review); see, e.g., FUNNY CIDE TEAM WITH SALLY JENKINS, FUNNY CIDE:
HOW A HORSE, A TRAINER, A JOCKEY, AND A BUNCH OF HIGH SCHOOL BUDDIES TOOK ON
THE SHEIKS AND BLUEBLOODS . . . AND WON (2004) (detailing the “out of nowhere”
success of Funny Cide, the 2003 Kentucky Derby and Preakness Stakes winner).
233
Thoroughbred ownership is arguably an even riskier investment for a
novice than the typical stock investment. “The speed of an animal and its ability to run
a distance are variables not subject to market surveys, not influenced by advertising
and sales techniques, and not obviously subject to rational analysis.” Miller, supra
note 5, at 783.
234
Secretariat won the Triple Crown (Kentucky Derby, Preakness Stakes, and
Belmont Stakes) in 1973, the first horse to do so in twenty-five years. Secretariat was
inducted into the National Thoroughbred Racing Hall of Fame in 1974. National
Museum of Racing and Hall of Fame, Secretariat, http://www.racingmuseum.org/
hall/horse.asp?ID=135 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
235
Like so many novice owners before them, many of these newcomers who
fall victim to a fraudulent horse deal will “disappear” from the thoroughbred industry
with only bad memories. See Paulick, Cot To Be Good, supra note 19.
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playing field a bit more level, then the Code has fallen short of
these aspirations in two glaring ways. First, by bowing to
consignor pressure and removing medication and surgery
disclosures from its Code of Ethics,236 TOBA has failed to
address one of the most pressing issues in racing today, the use
of anabolic steroids.237 This issue is most certainly on the
minds of auction participants. In May of 2006, as part of its
Sales Integrity Program, TOBA conducted a survey of owners
who had recently purchased thoroughbreds at auction.238 The
responses, particularly where research participants were able
to enter their own comments, clearly indicate that most
thoroughbred purchasers want full disclosure of surgeries and
medications, particularly anabolic steroids.239
Second, and most problematic, the Code completely
lacks enforcement provisions.240 Although TOBA is a respected
and influential association, it carries no direct authority over
anyone but its own members. Even among its own members,
the only punishment that TOBA could impose would be to strip
the violator of his membership. Assuming this information is
publicized in some way (which it probably is not), losing one’s
236

See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., AM. ASS’N OF EQUINE PRACTITIONERS, RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING MEDICATION IN HORSES PRESENTED FOR SALE AT PUBLIC AUCTION 3,
available at https://www.aaep.org/pdfs/pressroom/Medication%20in%20Horses%20
Presented%20for%20Sale%20at%20Public%20Auction.pdf (showing recommendations
of the American Association of Equine Practitioners’ Task Force on Medication Issues
at Public Auction, who concluded that “detectable level[s]” of anabolic steroids should
not be permitted at auctions); Denk, supra note 123 (reporting that officials from
Keeneland and Fasig-Tipton have formed a committee with various horse racing and
veterinary professionals in order to develop a standardized policy for anabolic steroid
testing at auctions); Finley, supra note 123 (noting that “the racing industry, concerned
about public perception and safety and integrity issues, may be about to join other
major sports in banning the use of steroids”); Rachel Pagones, Amy Bennett & Nancy
Sexton, Horse Racing: Steroid Policy Rethink in US, RACING POST, Jan. 22, 2007,
Sport, at 18.
238
THOROUGHBRED OWNERS AND BREEDERS ASS’N, SALES INTEGRITY PROGRAM
BUYER SURVEY 1 (2006), http://www.salesintegrity.org/downloads/TOBA%20Report.pdf.
239
Among the comments from research participants: “Anabolic steroids should
have a total ban—zero tolerance;” “Any sellers/consignors involved in this practice
[giving horses steroids to improve their appearance for sale] should be banned for life
from the industry;” “Worse than the dishonesty among agents is the drug situation.
Something must be done to stop the drugging of horses;” “I have purchased numerous
horses at auction that actually deflated within a week of the sale. The use of steroids
and other masking drugs is a larger problem, in my opinion, than the non-disclosure of
corrective surgery.” Id. at 19-28 (showing all comments).
240
See supra note 223; see also NAT’L CONSUMER COUNCIL (U.K.), supra note
223, at 51 (noting that in order to have an effective system of regulation, “[t]here must
be clear, accessible and well-publicised complaints procedures where breach of the code
is alleged;” and “[t]here must be adequate, meaningful and commercially significant
sanctions for non-observance”).
237
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TOBA membership would result in little more than
embarrassment. Unlike the British HRA,241 TOBA has no
influence on trainers’ licenses, which the states issue.
Stripping a trainer of his TOBA membership for a Code of
Ethics violation has absolutely no direct effect on his ability to
continue working as a trainer. The threat of revoking TOBA
membership is furthered weakened by the fact that only a
small percentage of Code violators would even be TOBA
members. Since TOBA focuses only on thoroughbred owners
and breeders,242 and membership is purely voluntary, many of
the most common violators, such as bloodstock agents and
trainers, might not even fit into one of these groups.
In spite of its shortcomings, the Code of Ethics does
have some value. Reputation has always been an integral part
of the horse racing industry.243 Traditionally, horse deals were
transacted “between people who knew each other, who had
dealt with each other before and who would deal with each
other again.”244 The industry was based on reputation, mutual
experience, and continued relationships. Over the years,
however, “new money” has infiltrated horse racing,
dramatically shifting the nature of the business from a closedin community insulated from risk by expertise and trust based
on long-lasting relationships, to an open market saturated with
novice buyers lacking knowledge about thoroughbreds and
racing industry custom.245
By spotlighting unscrupulous conduct, the Code has
reinforced the necessity of owners’ due diligence. The Code
itself states that its mission is “to improve the opportunity for
buyers at auction sales to feel informed, understand the
various aspects of the process, and be confident they were being
fairly treated.”246 Novice owners were at a great disadvantage
when faced with the daunting task of breaking into the
thoroughbred industry, partly because they were unaware of
241
Horseracing Regulatory Authority, Licensing Procedure, http://thehra.org/
doc.php?id=27295 (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
242
“TOBA’s mission is to improve the economics, integrity and pleasure of the
sport on behalf of Thoroughbred owners and breeders.” Thoroughbred Owners and
Breeders Ass’n, About TOBA, https://www.toba.org/about (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
243
See Miller, supra note 5, at 786.
244
Id.
245
Id. at 789; see also Cassidy, supra note 172, at 53 (explaining that “[a]s the
market for bloodstock grew—particularly during the boom of the 1970s and
1980s, . . . [t]he cozy intimacy of the bloodstock world was lost”).
246
See Sales Integrity Task Force, Mission, supra note 113.
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the fraud lurking behind these “trade customs.” Now, at the
very least, new owners know that “kickbacks” and concealed
physical defects exist at public auctions. Armed with this
knowledge, new owners are better prepared to investigate
agents before allowing them to bid on their behalf, inquire into
the ownership of horses they are interested in purchasing, and
hire veterinarians to thoroughly examine the horses for
masked defects.
As in every business transaction, due diligence is crucial
when one is buying a thoroughbred or choosing a bloodstock
agent. “The bottom line, if you’re a buyer, is that you need to
do your homework,” advises one thoroughbred owner.247
Although this owner is correct that buyers should “do [their]
homework,”248 this idealized emphasis on due diligence fails to
fully take into account the reality of the thoroughbred racing
industry. Many new buyers, particularly those for whom
thoroughbred racing is just a hobby or a side venture, choose to
employ bloodstock agents to save themselves the time of
researching all the thoroughbreds for sale, attending the
auctions, and following through on the transaction. These
agents are hired precisely so that owners do not have to do the
requisite “homework” themselves. Even if their blind trust is
not advisable, these owners are paying for a service and they
deserve to get what they paid for.
The thoroughbred market, like the stock market, is
most efficient when transactions are promoted in a setting
where the costs are as low as possible to the parties involved.
If principals are required to double-check and investigate every
move that their agents make, this might prevent the agents
from violating their fiduciary duties, but this security comes at
the price of productivity.249 The costs of continuing these
transactions will eventually become too high, and new buyers
will no longer invest.250 Since agents are such a vital part of the
thoroughbred industry, the industry must find a better way to
police the activity of bloodstock agents and punish those who
violate their fiduciary duties. This is not only to protect the
interests of individual buyers, but also to protect the efficiency
247

Biles, Code of Ethics, supra note 155.
Id.
249
The cost of agency to the principal goes beyond the monetary compensation
that he pays his agent. It includes transaction costs associated with planning and
monitoring his agent’s work. Salacuse, supra note 163, at 165.
250
See id.
248
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of the market, and ultimately, the survival of the industry
itself.
Agency law binds these agents to various duties, but
“agency law” cannot police the thoroughbred industry. It is up
to the industry itself to ensure that violations of these duties
are detected and dealt with accordingly. A code of ethics is an
integral part of a unified system of self-regulation, but without
anyone or anything to oversee this “regulation,” a code of ethics
will never have much of an impact.
There are, of course, some drawbacks to industry selfregulation. Allowing an industry to regulate itself presents the
risk that nothing will be done, or that self-regulation is merely
a “shield to ward off more meaningful regulation.”251 There is
also the concern that those in charge of regulation will prevent
the industry from modifying its practices because the old
system is economically beneficial to them.252 For example, the
veteran horsemen who currently lead the industry are in a
better position to succeed than new investors, due to the
veterans’ years of experience in the business. Even though the
current system of regulation is deficient, it is serving them well
because they know what to watch out for and who to trust. In
contrast, newcomers often have no racing industry experience
to draw from when choosing horses or hiring a bloodstock
agent. Since newcomers are most likely to be affected by
auction fraud, a better-regulated system of fraud prevention,
detection, and adjudication best serves their interests. The
risk is that a governance system controlled by veteran
horsemen might not regulate these problems as diligently as it
would if the veterans themselves were most affected by the
fraud.253
Despite the drawbacks of self-regulation, the
thoroughbred industry is quite resistant to federal regulation
for its auctions254 and it is unlikely that the industry will ever

251
Dale A. Oesterle, Comments on the SEC’s Market 2000 Report: On, Among
Other Things, Deference to SROs, the Mirage of Price Improvement, the Arrogation of
Property Rights in Order Flow, and SEC Incrementalism, 19 J. CORP. L. 483, 489
(1994) (quoting SUBCOMM. ON SEC., S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS,
SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1973)).
252
Id. (quoting SUBCOMM. ON SEC., S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 251, at 145).
253
See id. (quoting SUBCOMM. ON SEC., S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. &
URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 251, at 145).
254
See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 19 (“No one in his right mind would
entertain this.”); Lucas Marquardt, A Breath of Fresh Air: Q&A with Satish Sanan
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embrace such government oversight. Excluding government
regulation as a possibility, the only viable option for improving
auction practices is for the industry to develop a centralized
system of regulation. The industry has already modeled its
Code of Ethics after the British Code of Practice, so perhaps the
American industry should also modify its regulatory structure
(or complete lack thereof) to more closely resemble that of the
United Kingdom.255 No system is perfect, but having an official
body in charge of regulatory oversight for thoroughbred sales
would vastly improve the situation.
Although it remains uncertain exactly how the industry
could implement this structural overhaul, its necessity is clear.
By developing an official authority within the thoroughbred
sales business, the industry can adopt and implement a
standardized set of regulations to govern all public auctions.
Up to this point, the U.S. thoroughbred industry’s focus has
been exclusively on fraudulent misrepresentation in the public
auction setting, but the success of this system could lead to
extending the official agency’s authority to include private
sales as well.256 It might even be advisable to pursue state
licensing of bloodstock agents to ensure greater oversight into
their activities and stricter penalties for unscrupulous
conduct.257
The Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions
successfully brings the industry’s focus back onto reputation
and due diligence. These had always been vital features of
horse racing, long before novice horsemen infiltrated the racing
world, bringing “new money,” new customs, and new
Although due diligence is an important
problems.258
consideration in all business transactions, the American
thoroughbred industry can do better, and must do better, to
maintain its current investors and continue attracting new
(“Our game plan is to avoid government agencies if we can,” states Sanan.) (on file with
the Brooklyn Law Review).
255
For a discussion of the regulatory structure of horse racing in the United
Kingdom, see supra Part V.B.1.
256
Unlike TOBA’s Code of Ethics, the British Code of Practice applies to
private sales as well as public auctions. See THE JOCKEY CLUB, CODE OF PRACTICE,
supra note 10.
257
Many horsemen, including Jess Jackson, have supported this idea of
licensing bloodstock agents. However, others have criticized the proposal, citing the
impracticability of requiring state licenses in an international business like
thoroughbred sales. See Mary Meehan, Jess Jackson Backs Licensing, Disclosure,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Ky.), May 4, 2006, at A1.
258
See Miller, supra note 5, at 789.
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ones.259 The horse racing industry needs to implement an
official body to effectively enforce the Code of Ethics and other
horse sale regulations.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions is an
important step in the industry’s efforts to improve auction
practices, but it probably should not have been its first step.
TOBA and its supporters adopted the Code with the best of
intentions. The Code of Ethics has tremendous potential to
effectuate real change by standardizing approved auction
practices, but its proponents have gotten way ahead of
themselves. Without a regulatory body similar to the United
Kingdom’s Horseracing Regulatory Authority to implement the
Code of Ethics, its provisions are little more than “windowdressing,”260 or “merely a piece of paper with words.”261
The U.S. thoroughbred industry should develop a
centralized regulatory body to, among other duties, enforce the
Code of Ethics for Thoroughbred Auctions. By implementing
this new agency within the industry, the racing world could
provide new investors with more than false hope of procedural
fairness. Investing in racehorses will always be a risky
venture; economic success can never be guaranteed. Adopting
an effective system of self-regulation that investigates and
punishes instances of dual agency, undisclosed commissions,
and artificially represented horses will not safeguard these
investments. It will, however, contain the risk to that which
has always been a part of horse racing—a risk that new
investors have shown they are willing to take.
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259
See US: Sanan Calls for Sale Reform, RACING AND SPORTS (Austl.), July 6,
2004, available at http://www.iskander.com.au/breeding/rsNewsArt.asp?NID=44265
(quoting Satish Sanan, who argues that the thoroughbred industry needs to make
major changes in order to maintain its appeal to new owners and also current owners).
260
Freckelton, supra note 227, at 143-44.
261
Coady, supra note 223, at 48.
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